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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Edited by Craig Barker
I. AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS,
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS V
GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA,
ORDER FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES 25 MARCH 2011
A. Introduction
Africa has been struggling for years to establish a mechanism of human rights
protection comparable to other international and regional mechanisms. Illiteracy and the
low standards of economic development and social welfare, especially in rural areas, as
well as the absence of financial resources were certainly not the best grounds to build
on. Moreover, as Nmehielle notes, the creation of a human rights mechanism in Africa
was equally hinged on other questions, more controversial ones, such as the existence of
the concept of ‘law’ and ‘rights’ in pre-colonial Africa.1 In this respect, a Western-style
mechanism of human rights protection would be naturally perceived with suspicion, as a
form of foreign intervention.
However, several organizations and individuals, most notably, influential jurists such
as Kéba M’Baye, supported the idea of a human rights court, firmly believing that
Africa could, and should, benefit from a regional human rights protection mechanism.
Hence, the objections of many States were overcome2 and the Additional Protocol3 to
the African Charter (known as the Banjul Charter)4 was finally signed. The African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter: the Court) was officially established
in 1998, giving hope to many scholars and academics.5
Nevertheless, despite the evident progress over the years, the African system of
protection is still considered to be one of the weakest regional mechanisms. Compared
1 VO Orlu Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2001) 1–17.
2 See analytically G Bekker, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding
the Interests of African States’ (2007) 51 JAfrL 1, 151–72.
3 Signed 9 June 1998 during the Assembly of Heads of States of the Organisation of African
Unity (Summit of Ouagadougou) and entered into force upon signature by the required (art 30 of
the Protocol) 15 Member States of the African Union, with the fifteenth being State of the Comoros
25 January 2004, see OAU Doc. (1998) OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
4 Signed 27 June 1981, OAU doc (1982) CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 and entered into
force 21 October 1986.
5 A Stemmet, ‘A Future African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights and Domestic Human
Rights Norms’ (1998) 23 SAfrYIL 233. Κ Magliveras and G Naldi, ‘Reinforcing the African
System of Human Rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and
Peoples’ Rights’ (1998) 16 NQHR 4, 431–56. See also G Naldi and K Magliveras, ‘The Proposed
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Evaluation and Comparison’, (1995) 9
AfrJIntl&CompL 944.
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to the much more consolidated European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American
Court, the success of the African Court has been limited up to now. The difficulty of
providing justice in a continent that has witnessed many of the world’s worst atrocities
and crimes against humanity, as well as the numerous ‘clawback’ clauses of the Banjul
Charter,6 are only some of the reasons that could explain the system’s lack of authority.
The latter is equally triggered by some functional problems, such as the slowness of
procedures7 and the impossibility of individual petitions in most of the signatory States
of the Protocol,8 as well as individuals’ lack of awareness of the Court’s existence in
many cases. Furthermore, the African Union members have already signed the Protocol
of Sharm El-Sheikh, which envisages the merging of this Court with the African Court
of Justice, provided that the Protocol obtains the required 15 ratifications.9 This means
that an already weak and rather slow mechanism of human rights protection is soon
going to be replaced, resulting in additional instability.
For these reasons, it is only a positive surprise that on 25 March 2011 the Court
issued its second decision, the African Commission v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.10 It is a
prima facie optimistic moment in the field of human rights protection: the decision was
adopted by a Court in transition and at a time where the late General Muammar Gaddafi
was issuing threats against all, warning that ‘those leading the protesters will be hunted
down door to door and executed’.11
The present paper will analyse the order for provisional measures, highlighting its
powerful aspects. Moreover, it will discuss the frivolous impact that such a judgment
6 See VO Orlu Nmehielle (n 1) 165ff; G Bekker, ‘Recent Developments in the African Human
Rights System 2008–09’ (2009) 9 HRLRev 668.
7 See AP van der Mei, ‘Τhe New African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an
Effective Human Rights Protection Mechanism for Africa?’ (2005) 18 LJIL 113–29; also GM
Wachira, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Ten years on and still no justice (UNHCR,
London, 2008) available on the website of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees <www.unhcr.
org/refworld/pdfid/48e4763c2.pdf> accessed 5 October 2011.
8 See F Ouguergouz, The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive
Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague,
1993) 715ff. At present, unfortunately, only Mali, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Tanzania and Ghana
allow petitions by individuals and NGOs before the Court under art 5(3) of the Protocol that
provides that ‘[t]he Court may entitle relevant NGOs with observer status before the Commission,
and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34(6) of this Protocol’
and this is one of the dark spots in the Court’s functioning. Further, in the meeting of 18 April
2008, the Ministers of Justice of the States of the African Union clarified that individuals would be
allowed to lodge applications before the Court only in the case that the State party had previously
an explicit statement that it allows applications. Complaints about violations of applications in the
rest of the States are thus transferred to the Court by the African Commission, whilst art 5(1) of the
Protocol, which allows, nevertheless intergovernmental organizations to lodge applications, as well
as Inter-State petitions, has until now, not been applied.
9 Protocol to the summit of representatives of the African Union, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt,
1 July 2008. For these new developments, see mainly the article of the Judge and former President
of the Court G Niyungeko, ‘La Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples: défis et
perspectives’, (2009) 79 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme 171 (in French).
10 African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Order for Provisional Measures, 25 March 2011, App no 004/2011, para 1.
11 S Nakhoul, ‘Analysis: Gaddafi collapse will embolden Arab rebels’, Reuters, 22 August 2011
at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/us-libya-gaddafi-arab-idUSTRE77L1TX20110822>
accessed 25 September 2011.
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could have on the international scene of human rights protection, vis-à-vis the
tremendously volatile political context.
B. The Background
In its ninth extra-ordinary session, which took place on 24 February 2011 at its
headquarters in Banjul, Gambia, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (hereinafter the ‘Commission’) received many complaints about the situation
in Libya from dozens of local and international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Three of them (Human Rights Watch, Interights and the Egyptian Initiative
for Personal Rights) decided to submit a complaint to the Secretariat of the
Commission on 28 February 2011, in order to convey their grievances to the African
Court.12
The complaint was lodged by email and described the atrocities committed by
Gaddafi’s forces at the time: notably the infringement of Articles 1, 4, 9(2) and 10 of the
African Charter (namely, the right to life, to safety, to freedom of expression and
assembly). The applicants required immediately a ‘thorough and impartial’ investi-
gation to be undertaken in Libya, in order to punish the perpetrators of the violations
and to force both sides’ forces to immediately refrain from human rights abuses. The
report also stipulated the need to ensure that appropriate mechanisms were in place for
the elimination of arbitrary or abusive use of force by Libyan police and that the latter
would be punished as a criminal offence under Libyan law. Moreover, it suggested that
the law should be amended in order to provide for a fair compensation for protesters
who got injured or died during the demonstrations.13
On 3 March 2011, the Commission forwarded these complaints to the Court,
requesting Libya’s condemnation of serious and massive human rights violations
under the Banjul Charter.14 The Commission’s report to the Court stated that special
forces of the Libyan government had used deadly violence while suppressing the
peaceful demonstrations taking place in various cities, especially during those that
occurred on 20 February 2011 in the city of Benghazi (the second largest city of Libya
and the centre of the revolution), where many people were found to have been shot in
the head and the chest.15 The complaint also noted that the Libyan forces made
excessive use of heavy weapons against the population, including aerial bombardments.
According to the Commission, these facts involved grave and massive violations of
human rights.16
12 The complaint was based on arts 55 and 56 of the African Charter and art 102 of the Code of
Justice. The full version is available at <http://www.interights.org/news/4/index.html> accessed 25
September 2011. In the same session, which took place in Banjul, Gambia, on the 1 March 2011,
the Commission condemned among others ‘the divisionist speeches of the Head of State,
Mouammar El Gaddafi, and the bloody reprisal by the Government . . . against its own population’
and called upon the African Union and the international community to assume its responsibility.
See ACHPR/RES.181(EXT.OS/IX)2011: Resolution on the human rights situation in The Great
Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, CADHP/RES.181(EXT.OS/IX)2011, available at
<http://www.achpr.org/sessions/9th-eo/resolutions/181/> accessed 25 September 2011.
13 ibid 7–8. 14 African Commission v Libya, Provisional Measures, para 1.
15 Demonstrations took place also in other cities of Libya: Al-Baida, Ajdabiya, Zayiwa and
Derna in the eastern part of Libya. 16 ibid para 3.
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The Court’s decision on provisional measures was taken unanimously on the 25
March 2011 by the 11 judges of the Court, chaired by Mr Gérard Niyungeko.17 In many
respects the decision reiterates in substance the report of the Commission,18 stating in
conclusion that a violation of Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 23 of the African
Charter had occurred.19 The reasoning of the Court was relatively short. Having said
that it notified the application to the respondent State (since the latter is a member of the
African Union and has signed the Banjul charter),20 the Court placed great emphasis on
the fact that, given the gravity of the situation and according to Article 27(2) of the
African Charter and Article 51 of the Rules of the Court itself, it was self-authorized
(proprio motu) to order interim measures without the Commission’s request21 and
further, to do this without delay (this is to say, without a hearing).22 The decision also
stated that there was no need to ascertain at this stage whether the Court had jurisdiction
or not to discuss the merits of the case. It merely accepted a prima facie (formal)
authority, since Libya had signed the Protocol to the African Charter and since human
rights issues were at stake.23
As to the merits, the Court contented itself with recognizing the urgency of the case.24
It relied on three documents in this regard: first, the 23 February 2011 Resolution of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union,25 second, the 21 February 2011 call
of the Secretary General of the Arab League to end the violence,26 and third, the UN
Security Council Resolution 1973 that had ordered that the case be referred to the
International Criminal Court (ICC), imposing an arms embargo and an assets freezing
order on the Libyan leaders.27
The Court decided unanimously, first, that Libya ‘must immediately refrain from any
action that would result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons, which
could be a breach of the provisions the Charter or of other International human rights to
which it is a party’28 and secondly, that Libya should report to the Court within 15 days
of the day of receipt, on the measures taken to implement the Court’s order.29 As to
formalities, it ordered the Libyan authorities to indicate the names of its representatives
to the Court within 30 days and to respond to the application in writing within 60 days.
17 The judges sitting at the Court at that time were: Dr. Gérard Niyungeko (Burundi, President of
the Court), Sophia AB Akuffo (Vice President, Ghana), Jean Mutsinzi (Rwanda), Bernard
Makgabo Ngoepe (South Africa), Modibo Tounty Guindo (Mali), Fatsah Ouguergouz (Algeria),
Joseph Mulenga, Augustino Ramadhani (Tanzania), Duncan Tambala (Malawi), Elsie Thompson
(Nigeria) and Sylvain Oré (Ivory Coast).
18 African Commission v Libya, Provisional Measures para 2.
19 ibid para 3; see also n 13. 20 ibid paras 4–7.
21 ibid paras 8–12. Art 27(2) provides that ‘in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when
necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as
it deems necessary.’ 22 ibid para 13.
23 ibid paras 15–19. 24 ibid paras 20, 22.
25 ibid para 21. See the press release of February 23, available in English and French on the
African Union website at <http://www.au.int/fr/content/communiqu%C3%A9-du-cps-sur-la-
situation-en-libye> accessed 25 September 2011.
26 ibid. ‘La Ligue arabe appelle l’ONU à autoriser une zone d’exclusion aérienne en Libye’, Le
Monde, 12 March 2011 <http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/03/12/libye-le-regime-
maintient-la-pression-la-ligue-arabe-reunie-au-caire_1492097_3218.html> accessed 5 October
2011. It should be also noted that Libya is a member of both the Arab League and the
Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. 27 ibid. UN SC Res 1973 (26 February 2011).
28 ibid. 29 ibid para 25.
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C. The Positive Aspects of the Decision
The decision is noteworthy for many reasons. One of the most important features of the
decision concerned the involvement of local and international NGOs, something that
reveals the increasingly active involvement of civil society in the protection of human
rights in Africa.30 This observation is not without legal significance. The involvement
of the latter is legally entrenched, not only in regional instruments which provide for
specific roles for NGOs,31 but also in international declarations: for instance, at a
meeting in Paris in 1992, the ‘principle of interaction’ of all national, regional and
international bodies and the pluralist representation of social forces was proclaimed,
including NGOs, trade unions, institutes, universities and individuals had been
formulated by the former Commission on human rights.32
Furthermore, one should not overlook that NGOs have had a pre-eminent role to play
in the formation of the mechanism of human rights protection in Africa and particularly
in the genesis of the Banjul Charter,33 while some of them have also had specific
experience in the prosecution of African Heads of States such as the prosecution of the
former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, whose government had committed most
atrocious crimes against humanity.34
Today, in the absence of individual petition before the African Court, it is the NGOs,
along with regional HR Committees who essentially bring individual human rights
violations to light.35 Furthermore, NGOs have a pre-eminent role as intermediaries and
purveyors of information on human rights issues.36 Bearing in mind that the latter are
the initiators of many procedures for the new merged Pan-African Court,37 one would
30 This case had enormous participation of NGOs and the mechanism of protection of rights was
initiated in large part thanks to them via lobbying strategies and the order against the Libyan
Jamahirya was understandably seen by NGOs as great success. For example, Clive Baldwin,
counsel of the organization Human Rights Watch said this was a ‘key decision’ for the protection of
Human Rights; Rebecca Wright, from the Egyptian Association for the Protection of Human
Rights stressed that this was an extremely important development for the African system of the
protection of rights, while Joanne Sawyer from Interights, also described the decision as a ‘very
positive step’. See the website of the NGO Interights: <http://www.interights.org/news/4/index.
html> accessed 25 September 2011.
31 See art 5(3) of the Banjul charter (n 8); art 6(1) of the Nouakchott draft protocol which states
that the Court may entitle NGOs with an Observer Status before the African Commission. See also
F Ouguergouz, (n 8) 513–14 for the number of NGOs who are granted observer status (the author
submits that in May 2001, this number was as high as 258) and the subsequent problems, idem, 514
note 1775.
32 Paris Principles of 1992, Resolution 1992/54 of the Commission on Human Rights and
Resolution A/RES/48/134 of 20 December 1993 UN General Assembly. See also recent academic
initiatives to highlight the role of organizations in human rights protection, for instance the
Colloquium Actors, Collective Strategies and the European Field of Human Rights (Council of
Europe, Strasbourg, 21–22 June 2010). 33 See F Ouguergouz, (n 8) 20–5.
34 Habré was qualified as the ‘Pinochet africain’ and the only hope to give justice to his victims
today remains with the NGOs who advocate his extradition to Belgium; see <http://www.rnw.nl/
international-justice/article/african-union-press-senegal-extradite-habr%C3%A9> accessed 5
October 2011. See T Ondo, ‘Réflexions sur la responsabilité pénale internationale du Chef
d’Etat africain’ (2007) 1 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’Homme, 153–209 and (n 43).
35 As it has been the case in the past with many trials, detentions, tortures etc. In the field of
freedom of expression for instance, see International Pen and Others v Nigeria, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97
(1998). 36 See F Ouguergouz, (n 8) 513ff.
37 ie, the ‘Coalition for an Effective African Court’ network.
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hope that the active civil society involvement will also have an impact on the inclusion
of an individual petition before it and the jurisdiction ratione personae.
Another feature of the decision concerns the speed and dynamism with which the
Court acted. The disputed facts in relation to which the Commission’s intervention was
requested took place from mid-February to early March 2011. The first NGO’s
complaint to the African Commission was submitted on 29 February and the request
was tabled by the Commission in Court as early as 3 March. It arrived at the Court
Registry on 16 March and the Court called for Libya’s response within 60 days.38
Nevertheless, given the urgency of the situation, the Court adopted an enforceable
decision requiring the taking of provisional measures on 25 March, a mere ten days after
receipt of the complaint.39
The Court appeared in this case particularly dynamic, accepting prima facie
(and proprio motu) jurisdiction to hear the case. This dynamism is by no means
self-evident. The Court certainly has jurisdiction to deal with ‘all cases and disputes
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol
and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned’.40
However, since its establishment, its activities on the international scale have been
of rather minor importance and the procedures before it have usually been thwarted
by considerable bureaucratic obstacles.41 Only in 2006 were the first 11 judges
elected in accordance with Article 11 of Protocol (of which four were replaced in
July 2009);42 only in June 2006 were the internal rules of procedure adopted and it was
not until 2008 that the Court finally opened its doors. Since then the Court had issued
only one judgment, the notorious Michelot Yogogombaye v the Republic of Senegal
decision delivered in December 2009.43 In contrast to this earlier conservative stance,
the Court’s reaction to the referral of the situation to the Court is significant and
praiseworthy.
It should equally be noted that the dynamism of the Court reflects a more generalized
attitude towards a more effective implementation of human rights in Africa, both
from an institutional and a judicial point of view. On the one hand, there have been
several voluntary governance and self-monitoring systems promoting human rights
recently, such as the NEPAD Framework Document (2005) or the African Peer
Review Mechanism (which was set up under the AU but operates as part of the
38 African Commission v Libya, provisional measures, para 2. Article 37 of the Interim Rules of
the Court provides that ‘[t]he State Party against which an application has been filed shall respond
thereto within sixty (60) days provided that the Court may, if the need arises, grant an extension of
time.’
39 ibid para 2: ‘immediately refrain from any action that would result in loss of life or violation
of physical integrity of persons’.
40 Protocol of the Banjul Charter, art 3.
41 A good illustration of these obstacles is the procedure of the establishment of the Court itself.
Indeed, the idea of establishing the Court goes back to 1961: promoted initially with enthusiasm by
the Geneva-based International Jurists Commission during an international meeting (held in Lagos,
Nigeria), no further actions were undertaken. See International Jurists Commission, ‘African
Conference on the Rule of Law’, Lagos, 3–7 January 1961, Proceedings of the Meeting (1961). See
also generally Kéba M’Baye, Droits de l’Homme et des peuples en Afrique et la Charte africaine,
(Éditions de la Commission Internationale des Juristes, Geneva, 1986); F Ouguergouz (n 8) 19–48.
42 From the Assembly of the African Union held in Khartoum in January 2006.
43 Yogogombaye c. République du Sénégal, n°001/2008, 15 December 2009 and (n 34).
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NEPAD), which focus on democracy, good governance and human rights, but also
development.44 On the other hand, there is an obvious amelioration in the procedures
under the auspices of the African Commission, especially in the examination of State
reports.45
Thus, it seems that even at its last moments, vis-à-vis its impending merging, the
Court is trying in some way to redeem itself for its previous inaction and be seen as a
dynamic institution, in a case which apparently involved issues far beyond legal
requirements. This observation is also consistent with the significant increase of
activities over the last two years of the Court aiming at raising awareness for the
protection of human rights, particularly under the auspices of the present Vice-President
Sophia Akuffo46 and mainly in southern and south-west Africa.47 It is subsequently
essential therein to stress that the Court, even provisionally, accepted its authority to
order provisional measures.
D. The Turbulent Political Context and Difficult Areas of Decision
The limited role of the Court in casu is due not only to the turbulent political context but
also to the international aspects of the case, lying far beyond the Court’s role as the
guarantor of human rights. Accordingly, in assessing the overall value of this decision
we should equally bear in mind the corresponding movements in the international arena
for the ‘smoothing’ of the situation in Libya.
First, it should be taken into account that many international institutions—each for
its own reasons—had already begun to openly condemn Libya. These forums comprise
not only the UN General Assembly and Security Council,48 but also the African
Union49 (although it had kept a rather neutral position, given that Libya is a member
and Gaddafi in person was its President in 2009), and the League of Arab States.50
Two days before the aforementioned decision, even the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (of which Libya is also a member) invited through its Secretary General
‘all parties to exercise great restraint’, stressing, however, ‘the need for taking
precautions for the “acquisitions” of the Libyan people’.51 It is equally interesting
44 See for instance S McInerney-Lankford, ‘Human Rights and Development: a Comment on
Challenges and Opportunities from a Legal Perspective’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights
Practice 1, 51–82.
45 See the status on submission of State initial/periodic reports to the African Commission
in May 2010, available at <http://www.achpr.org/states/reports-and-concluding-observations/>
accessed 10 October 2011.
46 See the final statement of the 49th cycle of meetings of the Commission in Banjul 28
April – 12 May 2011.
47 See ie the events organized in the Republic of Mozambique in August 2011; the lectures in
Kampala, Uganda, in July 2011; the lecture of the Court’s President Mr. Niyungeko in Pretoria in
July 2011; the Conference on promotion of the Court in collaboration with the Government of the
Republic of Malawi in March 2011, etc. See for additional information and details on the
Commission’s website <http://www.nanhri.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
7&Itemid=2> accessed 5 October 2011.
48 UN Doc A/RES/65/265 (3 March 2011) (n 27).
49 See n 25. 50 See n 26.
51 See also the Press Release of the Organisation of Islamic States available on <http://www.oic-
oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id=5090&x_key=> accessed 5 Οctober 2011: . . . «tout en préservant
les potentialités et les acquis du peuple libyen» (in French).
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that the case had given rise to the international prosecution brought by the Prosecutor
of the ICC on 15 February 2011 against the late Muammar Gaddafi, personally, his son
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and the Libyan spy Abdullal al-Senousi, especially since the
African Union has repeatedly criticized the ICC as an institution that serves Western
interests.52
Moreover, it is important to question whether the decision had or had not a real
prospect of enforcement. A close scrutiny reveals that there was no such prospect.
First, the Court did not require direct action from the respondent State, even though
it ordered provisional measures. More precisely, the latter set a delay of 60 days to
receive an answer from the former Libyan Jamahiriya, while it was evident that the
process would suffer delays thereafter.53 This was also evident in the subsequent
decision, taken at the next regular meeting of the Court on 16 June 2011, which merely
prolonged the period allowed to Libya to list the names and addresses of its
representatives and does not mention the cessation of violence.54 Secondly, the Court
remains an organ of the African Union: it receives funding from it and is in many
regards liable to it.55 Of particular relevance to this case is the fact that the
implementation of an order against an African Union member is improbable if it is
not endorsed by other organs of the African Union. The Court, therefore, had every
reason to make an interim decision criticizing the Libyan Jamahiriya, in order to gain
independence and distinguish itself from the highly politicized organs of the African
Union.
E. Conclusions
This decision is not without merit. Perhaps due to the ‘heavy’ political climate, the
African Court demonstrated rapidity and dynamism, in contrast to its usual slow-
moving attitude, given the numerous obstacles of the human rights protection
mechanism in the African continent. The decision was important because it was a
unique opportunity for demonstrating—at least at a theoretical level—the universality of
human rights, especially the enshrinement of the absolute right to life during
international and civil conflicts. Moreover, the decision was also an attempt by the
Court to distinguish its role from the much more politicized role of the African Union,
which oscillates depending on the interests at stake. However, in the view of the author,
it was taken from a ‘safe’ standpoint; it costs nothing to issue a decision that has no real
effect or prospect of being implemented.
52 See on the case and three warrants of 27 June 2011, the ICC’s internet site <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/> (accessed 5 Οctober 2011.
53 See R Murray, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Order for Provisional
Measures against Libya: Greater Promise for Implementation of Human Rights in Africa?’ (2011) 4
EHRLR 464.
54 African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, order, App No 004/2011, judgment 16 June 2011, 4, para 10.
55 It is required under art 32 of the Protocol that ‘expenses of the Court, emoluments and
allowances for judges and the budget of its registry, shall be determined and borne by the OAU, in
accordance with criteria laid down by the OAU in consultation with the Court’. Equally, art 33 of
the Banjul Charter establishes that the Commissioners ‘are elected by the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity’.
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The hope is that the future merged African Court will continue to envisage an even
more dynamic role for itself including in relation to the acceptance of its competence to
judge. The recurrence of the positive steps taken in casu which this paper has
highlighted (ie dynamism, autonomy, rapidity, acceptance of the universality of human
rights and NGOs involvement) is crucial to the improvement of human rights standards
in Africa.
ELENI POLYMENOPOULOU*
II. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF
THE INTERIM ACCORD OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1995 (THE FORMER
YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA V GREECE)
JUDGMENT OF 5 DECEMBER 20111
A. Introduction
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on 17 November 2008 filed
in the Registry of the International Court of Justice an application instituting
proceedings against Greece in respect of a dispute concerning the interpretation and
implementation of the so-called Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (IA). FYROM’s
NATO candidacy had been considered at the Bucharest Summit on 2–3 April 2008.
FYROM was, however, not invited to begin talks on accession to the organization. It
sought, in particular, to establish that Greece had objected to its admission to NATO
(ultimately preventing the formation of the necessary consensus for the invitation to be
extended) and therefore violated Article 11(1) IA.
Under the first clause of that provision, Greece agreed ‘not to object’ to FYROM’s
admission to international or regional organizations of which Greece is a member. In the
second clause, however, Greece reserved the right to object to such admission if and to
the extent that FYROM was to be referred to in those organizations differently than in
Paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 (1993). This resolution
recommends that FYROM be admitted to membership in the United Nations, being
‘provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the difference that has arisen
over the name of the State’.
The IA, a modus vivendi,2 aimed precisely at keeping the discontent relating to the
name dispute from tainting the international relations between the signatories, setting a
comprehensive set of mutual commitments, collateral to their pledge ‘to continue
negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations . . . with
a view to reaching agreement on the difference [about the name]’ (Article 5(1) IA).
* Eleni.Polymenopoulou@brunel.ac.uk.
1 ICJ General List No 142.
2 This source is a temporary arrangement in force pending the solution of a dispute, intended to
be replaced subsequently. As far as other matters than the dispute at issue are concerned, it is
tantamount to a treaty. See for a discussion WM Reisman, ‘Unratified Treaties and Other
Unperfected Acts in International Law: Constitutional Functions’ (2002) 3 VandJTransnatlL 738ff.
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